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MODES OF COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION OF SELF-STATEMENTS^
SUMMARY
From among 71 volunteer undergraduate psychology students 
subjects were selected on the basis of their response to a dual 
sorting task in which they were asked to sort two sets of 50 
identical self-statements into a number of categories of their 
choosing. It was assumed that the stimuli of the second sort 
were more self-involving since the initial sort instructions 
were to sort the statements "as statements," ignoring the fact 
they are self-referring. The second sort instructions requested 
that they be sorted "as they apply to you." Subjects using more 
categories on the second sort were identified as positive shifters, 
negative shifters used fewer categories. The extreme six male and 
six female positive shifters were compared with the extreme six 
male and six male negative shifters in terms of California Psy­
chological Inventory personality profiles and field-dependence 
measures on the Hidden Figures-Test.
^This paper is based on a dissertation submitted to the 
University of Oklahoma in partial fulfillment of the require­
ments for the Ph.D. Degree.
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No differences in personality organization were found, either 
between shift groups or between sexes. Nonsignificant correla­
tions were found between shift and Hidden Figures Test Scores.
The lack of significant correlations suggested shift to be in­
dependent of field-dependence. The inability to differentiate the 
extreme scorers on the shift dimension was thou^t to reflect the 
inability of an inventory type personality test, adequate as a 
measure of interpersonal behavior, to reveal differences between 
normal subjects at a level of cognitive organization.
INTRODUCTION
Relatively early in the development of categorization pro­
cedures as a tool to study attitudes, Sherif and Hovland (1953) 
noted that subjects who were judging stimuli in a categorization 
task tended to place those items which appeared actually to be 
rather neutral into categories further from their own position.
They concluded that if subjects were allowed to choose for them­
selves the number of categories used, the number decided upon 
might be used as an index of the subjects’ intensity of involve­
ment with an issue. This method they referred to as the "own cate­
gories technique."
Sherif and Sherif (1967) attempted to explain the relation­
ship of fewer categories used as a function of greater involve­
ment in terms of an "assimilation-contrast effect." In essence, 
the subject’s "own position" provided an anchor in a range of 
possible alternatives, and he was more discriminating in the
3
range of alternatives the doser they were to his own position. 
Essentially, those not seen as quite similar were seen as quite 
dissimilar.
Glixman (1965) offered additional support for the relation­
ship between increased involvement and decreased number of cate­
gories in a study in which he varied the domain of statements sub­
jects were to sort. The stimuli were 1) verbal descriptions of 
common objects, 2) statements about nuclear war, and 3) 92 state­
ments about the self which approximated an hierarchial range of 
statements from least to most relevant to self. He found that 
most categories were used in the object domain and fewest in the 
self domain and concluded that, as the personal relevance of the 
stimuli increased, category width decreased and more neutral items 
were displaced away from the range of statements with which a 
subject identified. In further research, Glixman (1967) supported 
this conclusion and introduced findings that examiner and examiner- 
sex factors influenced categorization behavior.
Briece (1966) introduced findings regarding self ideal self 
discrepancy. She noted that with an increase in the self, ideal- 
self discrepancy, there was a corresponding decrease in the number 
of categories subjects used when shifting from the object to self­
domain. The also found the relationship functioned in different­
ial degree between sexes.
The widely held view that as the self-relevance of the stimuli 
increased the number of categories chosen would decrease was sub­
stantiated repeatedly and was shown to be a non-unitary relationship.
It
rather one influenced by both self reference (Briece, 1966) and 
interpersonal variables (Glixman, 1967).
Cornelius (1968) questioned previous conclusions upon noting 
that while most subjects' performance confirmed theoretical ex­
pectations a small, but consistent minority did not. He adminis­
tered a dual sorting task to 20 male and 29 female elementary 
school teachers. He asked them to sort two identical sets of 50 
self-statements into categories of their design. They were asked 
to sort the first set "as statements, ignoring the fact that they 
are first person or self-referring statements" and the second set 
"as they apply to you." He assumed the second set to be more self­
involving. He characterized those using a greater number of cate­
gories on the second sort as "positive shifters." "Negative 
shifters" used fewer categories, and "zero shifters" used the 
same number on both sorts. The three shift groups were signifi­
cantly differentiated in terms of their self-ideal discrepancy 
and on the number of differentiations they characteristically 
made between stimuli across tasks. He concluded that shift con­
stituted a cognitive control associated with categorization be­
havior and speculated that, in keeping with research relating 
cognitive style and personality variables, positive and negative 
shifters would differ in personality organization. The operation 
of making differentiations in a categorization task theoretically 
paralleled Witkin's (1962) differentiation hypotheses and sug­
gested a direct relationship between shift and field-dependence 
dimensions. The lack of research in this area leaves these
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conclusions in the area of speculation.
The present research was an attempt to determine the rela­
tionship between field-dependence and shift and to describe the 
differential personality characteristics of positive and negative 
shifters. A more extensive listing of hypothesis is included 
in Appendix I. It was believed that differential personality 
characteristics would exist and would lend support to the valid­
ity of shift as a cognitive control factor.
METHOD
Selection of Subjects
Subjects were 41 male and 30 female volunteers enrolled in 
an undergraduate introductory psychology course. From among the 
71 subjects who completed the dual sorting task, the 6 extreme 
males and females of both the positive and negative shift groups 
were selected to comprise the test sample. Little is known re­
garding the distribution of the shift dimension in the general 
population but it was assumed to approximate that of the field- 
dependence dimension. Therefore, it was assumed that subjects 
18 to 21 years of age were of equivalent developmental levels in 
terms of field-dependence (Paterson and Witkin, 1970).
Test Instruments and Procedures
Initially, all 71 subjects were requested to complete two 
sorting tasks. Fifty of the Butler and Haigh (1954) self-state­
ments were printed on two stacks of standard sized IBM cards.
The subjects were asked to "place into categories those statements
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that seem to you to go together.” The instructions for the first 
sort suggested that they be sorted "as statements, ignoring the 
fact that they are first person, or self referring statements."
The second sort instructions suggested that they be sorted "as 
they apply to you." It was assumed that the instructions dictated 
that the second sort statements would be more self-involving than 
the first. The sorting task was administered in small groups, 
varying in size from 8 to 13 subjects at each test session. This 
was essentially a replication of Cornelius' procedure, with the 
exception that his subjects complete the sorting task individually.
To insure the extremes of each shift group, a suggestion of 
Cornelius' (1971) was adopted. Only those subjects who increased 
in number of categories on the second sort and who used nine or 
more categories on the second sort were considered positive 
shifters. Those who used fewer categories on the second sort and 
who used four or fewer constituted the negative shift group. Ties 
existed within both the female negative shifters and male nega­
tive shifters. Ties were eliminated by selecting at random from 
among the group of least extreme scores the number of subjects 
required to assure equal sized groups. Thus, four equal sized 
groups of six each--male positive shifters, female positive shift­
ers, male negative shifters and female negative shifters— were 
asked to complete the two additional measures.
The extreme shifters were asked to complete the Hidden- 
Figures-Test, which has reportedly high correlations with other 
measures of field-dependence (Goodman, 1962), and the California
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Psychological Inventory which gives a reliable measure of general 
personality characteristics (Gough, 1957). These two measures 
were administered in 3 sessions with between 7 and 10 subjects 
participating per session. Efforts were made to insure the 
anonymity of the subjects’ shift group identity so as to mini­
mize any experimenter biasing effects within the testing situ­
ation.
Experimental Design
The four groups were compared in their responses to the 18 
scales of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). The 
data were transformed to standard scores and were analyzed in 
a split-plot factorial design with non-repeated measures on 2 
factors and repeated measures on one factor (Kirk, 1968) . The 
extent of association between shift and field-dependence dimen­
sions was tested with individual Spearman Rank Order Correlation 
Coefficients (rs) for females, males and total group.
RESULTS
Initial test of homogeneity of error terms for the CPI data 
analysis indicated the assumption of homogeneity was upheld for 
Subj. W/Groups (Fmax (5,5) = 1.78, p ̂  .05), and the other error 
terms, B x subj. w/groups (Fmax (85,85)^  1.00). Data were ana­
lyzed in original form using standard F tests (Kirk, 1968).
An analysis of the CPI data revealed no differences between 
shift groups (F (1,20) = 1.33, p. > .05), between sex groups (F 
(1,20) ^  1.00), or the interaction of sex and shift groups
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(F (1,20) ^  1.00). Interactions between shift groups and person­
ality (F (17, 3W )  <  1.00), between personality and sex (F (17,3>+0) 
<  1.00) and the interaction effects of sex, shift and personal­
ity measures (F (17,3"+0) ^  1.00) were found to be non-signifi­
cant. Mean score differences among the scales of the California 
Psychological Inventory were found (F (17,3"+0) = 10.90, p. ^  .01).
Newman-Keuls Tests of Means (Kirk, 1968) revealed mean dif­
ferences between Sc (37.83) to be great enou^ from Do (51.50),
Fe (53.04), Ai (53.75), Sp (57.04), Sa (59.29), Fx (59.45) to 
exceed p. <  .01. The difference between mean Gi (38.29) and those 
of Do (51.50), Fe (53.04), Ai (53.75), Sp (57.04), Sa (59.29),
Fx (59.45) was great enou^ to exceed p. .01. Each oj the 
means Re (40.91), Wb (41.50), To (43.58), Ac (43.66) was different 
enou^ from means Sp (57.04), Sa (59.29) and Fx (59.45) to exceed 
p .^  .01. The difference between mean So (45.70) and Sa (59.29), 
Fx (59.45) was great enough to exceed p. <  .01.
Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients (rs) were used 
to test the extent of association between shift rank and the rank 
scores of Hidden-Figures-Test measure of field dependence (Slegal, 
1956). None of the correlations for females (rs - .08, p >  .05), 
for males (rs = -.45, p > .05) or for combined group (rs = -.34, 
p > .05) were found to be significant.
Of the 71 subjects who completed both sorting tasks at two 
levels of self-involvement 16 males and 14 females used a greater 
number of categories on the second sort, 17 males and 12 females 
used fewer categories, and 6 males and 6 females used the same
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number on both sorts. The range on the second sort varied from 
2 categories to 15.
DISCUSSION
In terms of the proportions of people who fell into the 
positive shift group compared to the negative shift group, dis­
tribution alone leads one to suspect the universality of the 
association between increased self-involvement and decreased 
number of categories. Results tend, in fact, to support Cornelius’ 
contention that increased involvement with the stimuli is treated 
differentially by subjects with differing cognitive styles assoc­
iated with categorization tasks. However, the attempt of the 
present study to find differential patterns of personality organ­
ization corresponding to the extreme scorers on the dimension of 
cognitive behavior referred to as shift, found no differences.
One explanation may be the inappropriateness of the person­
ality measure used in the study. The California Psychological 
Inventory represents an adequate measure of personality character­
istics at a level of interpersonal behavior. The single true- 
false answers required to complete the CPI seems less than ade­
quate to exploit the cognitive processes necessary to complete 
the dual sorting task. It seems quite likely that cognitive dif­
ferences between relatively normal subjects will not necessarily 
be reflected as measurable differences at a level of interpersonal 
behavior.
An additional factor bearing on the lack of differences may
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have resulted from some artifact of the testing procedure. The 
instructions for the sorting tasks were essentially a replication 
of those of Cornelius. However, his subjects completed the task 
individually without pressure to finish in a given time. Obser­
vation of the subjects during the sorting task for this study 
suggested the possible influence of social pressures to avoid 
taking too long to complete a task and eye contact with others’ 
performance may have biased results of people not wanting to be 
too out of line with the performance of others.
While the group means on the CPI were generally what would 
be expected from a normal sangle, on two scales the group means 
varied more than one standard deviation from the corresponding 
normal group mean. Their performance on one of these scales sug­
gested a need to make a socially "good inpression." Perhaps this 
tendency combined with the biasing effect of social pressures 
contributed to some minor distortion of the test sample on the 
cognitive dimension. Individual administration of the sorting 
task seems preferrable.
While subjects who were differentiated on the cognitive 
dimension of shift were not distinguishable in terms of person­
ality characteristics, the lack of significant correlations between 
shift performance and field-dependence measures can be interpreted 
to mean that shift and field-dependence bear no direct relation­
ship to one another. The cognitive control dimension of shift 
appears to be independent from that of field-dependence.
Findings suggest first, that in terms of the absolute numbers
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of subjects who used more categories on the second sort of a dual 
sorting task, the increased self-involvement-decreased number of 
categories theory can be questioned. Second, the inability to 
find significant correlations between shift scores and HFT scores 
suggests shift to be an independent cognitive control dimension 
from that of field-dependence. Third, althou^ different shift 
groups were not differentiated on the basis of personality in­
ventory scores, the feasibility of the use of an inventory type 
personality test is doubtful since the level of behavior which it 
measures may not reflect differences between normal subjects who 
tend to be different at the level of cognitive organization.
Any future attempt to replicate the present study should 
modify the procedure by employing a personality measure more 
suited to the level of cognitive organization and to consider 
administration of the dual sorting task individually so as to 
avoid contamination of sorting behavior by social interaction 
factors. While procedural difficulties of the present study 
seriously delimited the extent to which conclusions could be 
reached, the inability to find personality differences in sub­
jects with differential shift performance styles leaves the valid­
ity of the shift variable open to question. Future research 
might focus on this point. In addition, the results of the 
present study failed to reveal any sex-differences. This is in 
direct contrast to Cornelius’ findings and bears further in­
vestigation.
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The use of categorization tasks as tools with which to study 
behavior dates from the initial studies in psychophysics and was 
employed in the early development of scaling procedures (Likert, 
1932 and Thurstone and Chave, 1929). Sherif and Hovland (1953) 
used a categorization task to study attitude measurement. Rogers 
and Dymond (1951) provided the initial impetus for the use of 
Stephenson’s (1953) Q-sort to assess the discrepancy between self 
and ideal self. Self-ideal discrepancy came to be measured in 
other ways also, most notable that of Leary (1957) and Osgood, 
et. al.. (1957). Categorization tasks have been used in a wide 
variety of approaches to the study of behavior, thus its import­
ance is apparent.
Historically, while the uses of categorization tasks have 
increased, the tasks have undergone modifications, especially in 
the area of attitude study. Originally, investigators (Thurston 
and Likert) prescribed the number of categories in which subjects 
were to place the stimuli which they were categorizing. Sherif 
and Hovland (1953) noted however, that subjects who were judging 
stimuli tended to place into categories further from their own 
position those items which appeared actually to be rather neutral. 
They concluded that if subjects were allowed to choose for them­
selves the number of categories used the number decided upon m i ^ t  




Following up the discovered relationship between number of 
categories and the intensity of attitude held on a particular 
issue, subsequent investigations derived some rather consistent 
findings. Reich and Sherif (1963), for exan^le, used subjects 
from the League of Women Voters and employed Sherif and Hovland’s 
"own categories" technique to assess their attitudes with regard 
to the issues of reapportionment. They found these subjects to 
use fewer categories than did another population much less knowl­
edgeable about the issue. While the women from the Voteras League 
were able to make finer discriminations they did not do so.
Sherif and Sherif (1967) attempted to explain the relation­
ship of fewer categories used as a function of greater involve­
ment in terms of an "assimilation-contrast effect." In essence, 
the subject's "own position" provided an anchor in a range of 
possible alternative positions. Within the range on the continuum 
in which their positions fell, the subject was more discriminating 
as to which positions he was willing to allow assimilated with his 
own. All positions he was not willing to assimilate with his own 
were displaced away from it, in effect, those not seen as quite 
similar were perceived as quite dissimilar.
Categorization Tasks and Cognitive Study
Cognition, althou^ a relatively recent development within 
the general field of personality, has become a focal point of 
study. This point was well attested by Bieri (1967) who pointed
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out that "although a start has been made to link the development 
of cognitive structures to attitudes, especially in relation 
to attitudes toward authority, this effort can only be considered 
to have barely begun 18l7."
Perhaps an even more direct exanple relating categorization 
tasks to cognition was provided by Gardner (1953) in which he 
asked subjects to "put together into groups the objects which 
seem to you to belong together." These instructions defined the 
format used by Gardner in his Object Sorting Test which he de­
vised to investigate a cognitive control principle he called "equi­
valence range," The control principle accounts for the difference 
between subjects in the degree to which they are irr^elled to act 
upon or ignore their awareness of the differences between stimuli 
they encounter and is thought to underlie all categorization be­
havior.
Assumption of Cognitive Control Principles 
The basic assunçtion upon which the study of cognitive con­
trols rests is that ". . .the wide range of behaviors with which 
an individual encounters reality may be encompassed by a relative­
ly few dimensions of organization (Gardner, Holzman, Klein,
Harriet, and Spence, 1959, p. 1.)." Gardner specified that a
control principle referred to,
. . .a level of organization underlying 
perception, recall, and judgement. The invariant 
which defines a control has to do with the man­
ner of coordination between a class of adaptive
intentions and a class of environmental situations.
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They are the individual’s means of programming 
the properties, relations, and constraints of 
events and objects in such a way as to provide 
as adaptively adequate resolution of the in­
tentions which brou^t him into an encounter 
with reality (Gardner, et. al., 1959, p. 5-6).
Cognitive controls thus serve as predispositions of the indi­
vidual to organize aspects of the stimulus field in certain ways 
which transfer from context to context independently of the par­
ticular arrangement of stimuli. Cognitive controls have been 
attributed to have particular adaptive functions for the organism. 
It has been assumed that:
1} They govern the extent of informational 
feedback— the degree and extent of renewed encounter 
with stimuli or ideas before an adaptive intention 
is deemed met and an adaptive behavioral sequence is 
terminated. (2) They involve the application of 
automatized standards of adequacy to behavior or 
experience. If the behavior outcome does not meet 
these standards of adequacy perceptual or ideational 
activity is renewed to a point reflecting the in­
herent requirement of a control. (3) The outcome 
of a cognitive control is a pattern of attribution. 
in which stimulus events and ideas are brou^t into 
relation to each other as relevant and irrelevant, 
experienced and nonexperienced, segments of a 
stimulus field. (Gardner, et. al., 1959, p. 10)
Cognitive Controls and Ego Defenses 
Out of Hartmann’s (1958) postulation of "conflict free 
spheres of ego function" emerged the notion of areas of psycho­
logical processes not necessarily burdened in growth by antag­
onistic forces within the psychological structure. He proposed 
that these domains of function grew from some innate potential of 
the organism to adapt to its environment and involved the functions 
of learning and maturational processes such as perception
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intention, object-comprehension, thinking, language, recall 
phenomena and certain aspects of motor development. It was pre- 
cisely these functions which Gardner saw as synonymous with the 
notions of cognitive controls (Gardner, et. al., 1959).
Klein (1954-) first discussed the relationship between control 
principles and defenses in discovering that constricted and flex­
ible control, identified in subject's performance on relatively 
neutral cognitive tasks, accounted partially for individual dif­
ferences in the effects of thirst on performance in a variety of 
cognitive tasks. Gardner (et. al., 1959) reported a study in which 
the relationship between leveling and repression showed that re­
pressors tended to be levelers and that extreme isolators tended 
to be broad scanners, but the converse did not hold true. That 
is, the control tendency was not a valid basis on which to predict 
a subject's main defense pattern. The relationship of repression 
and leveling was verified in a later study (Holzman and Gardner, 
1959).
Weddig (1968) employed a factor analytic procedure in an 
attempt to support the idea that 108 college students who demon­
strated extreme scores on particular control indices would also 
display differences in ego defense patterns. Data consisted of 
measures on the Defense Mechanism Index, the Repression-Sensiti- 
zation Scale and five measures identified as criterion measures 
for five independent controls. It was hypothesized that specific 
ego defense measures would demonstrate salient loading on unique 
cognitive control factors. He found that level of defensiveness
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differed significantly for leveling-sharpening, scanning and equi­
valence range, althougji analysis failed to show independence of 
control factors.
Several studies have used Rorschach ratings of particular 
defense indicators and found significant relations between iso­
lation and field-independence (Bertini, 1960) and between intel- 
lectualization and field-independence (Schimek, 1968). Ihilevich 
(1968) sought to clarify the relationship of field dependence- 
independence and five defenses tapped by the Defense Measuring 
Instrument. He found that subjects who relied on the more "global" 
defenses tended to be more field-dependent and those who relied 
on the more "differentiated" defenses tended to be field-inde­
pendent. He found it impossible to predict a subject^s single 
major defense, however, merely from their position on the control 
dimension.
The exact relationship between defenses and cognitive con­
trols is not clear. What does seem clear is that a tendency for 
a particular type of defense is predominant in people with a 
particular cognitive style, and that a tendency toward a general 
type of personality pattern is related to a particular cognitive 
style (Witkin, 1967). Gardner perhaps clarified the confusion 
to some extent when he proposed that "the undirectionality of 
these relationships may offer some support to the hypothesis that 
controls provide preconditions for the emergence of defenses" 
(Gardner, et. , 1959, p. 136). In Gardner's view, repression, 
for example, would evolve from a general tendency toward maximal
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assimilation between present and past experiences which would lead 
to rather undifferentiated memory recollections.
Related Studies on Cognitive Control Principles
Several cognitive control principles have been identified.
In a comprehensive investigation of six of the more widely known 
of these Gardner (et. , 1959) employed factor analytic tech­
niques in trying to develop a more precise description of these 
dimensions and to bring them under tighter operational control. 
Their intention was to become more able to specify the tasks and 
adaptive intentions to which they were specifically linked. Ex­
amined in the study were the controls of leveling-sharpening 
(Holzman and Klein, 1951, 1959^; Holzman, 1954; and Holzman and 
Gardner, 1959); focusing or scanning (Holzman and Klein, 1956; 
Schlesinger, 1954); constricted-flexible control (Smith and Klein, 
1954); equivalence range (Gardner, 1953; Sloane, 1959); tolerance 
for unrealistic experiences (Klein and Schlesinger, 1951) and 
field dependence-independence (Witkin, 1934).
These investigators concluded that each of the previously 
identified control principles was an independent dimension and 
served as a basis to predict perfoimiance on the individual 
measures used in the study (Gardner, et. al., 1959). Since each 
control was independent they found that individual subjects had 
widely different patterns of factor scores. This fact led them 
to accept the feasibility of adopting Klein’s (1958) suggestion 
that the term cognitive style refers to an individual's unique
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constellation of individual control scores, such that one’s score 
on the field-dependent dimension did not exclude him from any one 
point on, for exanple, the constricted-flexible dimension. This 
term has been used to mean something minimally different, however. 
Witkin and Oltman (1967) pointed to the fact that a person’s 
perceptual mode displays itself in single or combinations of 
sense modalities. They used the term "style" because it refers 
to the tendency to organize experience in particular ways which 
encompasses both perceptual and intellectual activities.
Particularly relevant to the present study, Gardner (et. 
al., 1959) found that the factor involved in subject’s differ­
entiating of stimulus objects and placing them into categories 
was a factor independent of performance on other control measures. 
Equally important they found that the Object Sorting Test was the 
best measure of the control of equivalence range. The instructions 
for this test are identical to those used in Sherif and Hovland’s 
(1953) own categories technique. They also found a difference in 
the factor for men and women.
Gardner and Schoen (1962) presented three studies in a mono­
graph in which they attempted to find the generalizability of the 
equivalence range control from one task situation to another and 
to find its relationship to that of level of abstraction. They 
renamed the control principle conceptual differentiation. These 
investigators used several sorting measures previously used to 
assess conceptual differentiation and required subjects to 
specify their categories on some measures so as to enable the
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evaluation of their level of abstraction. They concluded that 
the level of abstractness a subject uses to integrate stimuli 
into categories was a factor independent of conceptual different­
iation and was determined by both the subject’s preference and 
capacity to abstract (Gardner and Schoen, 1962).
Glixman (1965) varied the domain of the statements subjects 
were to sort into content areas that consisted of: (1) verbal
descriptions of common objects (such as those in the Object Sorting 
Test), (2) a group of statements about nuclear war, and (3) 92 
statements about the self. The three domains were regarded as 
hierarchial, ranging from least to most relevant to self. The 
number of categories used was the criterion measure. He found 
that more categories were used in the object domain and there was 
a more unequal distribution of items over categories in the self 
domain. Glixman concluded that as the personal relevance of the 
stimuli increased the category width decreased and more neutral 
items were displaced away from that range of statements with which 
a subject identified (Glixman, 1955).
In a later study in which only self and object domains were 
used, Glixman (1967) soug)it to evaluate examiner and examiner- 
sex effects on categorizing behavior. His findings revealed no 
sex differences in categorizing behavior, though examiner-sex 
effects were found. He concluded that although minor, these inter­
actions might have had an influence on prior research causing the 
sex difference effect.
2Lt
Briece (1966) studied the effects of self-ideal self discrep­
ancy, as measured by the Leary Interpersonal Checklist, and the 
difference in number of categories subjects used to sort state­
ments that were instructionally varied within the object and 
self domains. She concluded that as the degree of discrepancy 
between self and ideal self increased the number of categories 
rsed correspondingly decreases when shifting from the object to 
self domain. Briece also found a difference in cognitive struc­
turing between male and female subjects. Women in general 
tended to be more consistently structured across domains, al- 
thou^ men tended to be more highly organized within the self 
domain.
A review of the relevant literature pointed to some rather 
consistently supported conclusions. Namely, considering Glixman*s
(1965) studies as representative, as self involvement increases 
the number of categories used to discriminate between stimuli 
decreases. This was the finding of Sherif and Hovland (1953) and 
was verified in later research by Glixman (1965, 1967) and Briece
(1966). Additional evidence shows categorization not to be a 
unitary dimension, rather one affected by both self-reference and 
interpersonal variables.
Close inspection of the data led Cornelius (1968) to question 
the widely accepted conclusions of previous research. He noted 
that, for example, in Briece's study while 17 subjects did use 
fewer categories as self involvement increased, 17 used the same 
number and 6 used more categories. He felt it possible to explain
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the differential performance as reflecting some systematic pattern 
inexplicable with existing interpretations.
Cornelius attempted to explore two sets of relationships ; both 
ego-involvement and categorization behavior and self-ideal discrep­
ancy and categorization behavior. His subjects were 20 male and 
29 female elementary school teachers who completed protocols, of 
the 100 randomly selected subjects to whom protocols were mailed. 
They consisted of two sorting tasks and a semantic differential 
comprised of 4 concepts and 15 scales. The two sorting tasks 
were identical sets of 50 of the Butler and Haigh (1950) self 
statements. Instructions for the two sorts were modifications of 
Gardner's (1953) Object Sorting Test instructions. On the initial 
sort subjects were asked to sort the statements "as statements, 
ignoring the fact that they are first person, or self-referring 
statements." The second set were to be sorted "as they apply to 
you." The latter sort was assumed to constitute a level of self­
involvement increased over the former. The number of categories 
used was the measure. Two measures were obtained from the 
Semantic differential, one a self-ideal discrepancy measure and 
the other a "sum of difference" score. The latter was the absolute 
difference in number of categories used on the scales in the 
semantic differential and was felt to reflect a subject's cate­
gorization style, a cognitive style appropriate to that task.
Cornelius (1968) found that the number of categories used 
on Sort I were no different from what m i ^ t  be expected as a 
matter of chance, yet as the self-involvement increased on Sort II,
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three rather distinct groups emerged. Eight male and 14- female 
subjects used fewer categories on Sort II and defined what was 
referred to the negative shift group, 8 male and 8 female subjects 
used more categories and constituted the positive shift group and 
4 male and 7 female subjects used the same number of categories 
on Sort II. They were the zero shifters. The positive and nega­
tive shifter patterns of categorization behavior emerged as a 
function of increased self-involvement and were conspicuously re­
lated to both self-ideal discrepancy and the sum of differences 
score on the semantic differential. Zero shifters were not signi­
ficantly differentiated in terms of the additional measures.
To explain the differences in performance between the posi­
tive and negative shift groups Cornelius (1968) pointed to Witkin^s 
(1962) "Differentiation Hypothesis." Extreme positive shifters 
as a group used far more categories, i.e., differentiations be­
tween stimuli, across tasks than did extreme negative shifters.
This suggested that they compromise a group balanced toward the 
differentiation side of the differentiation-integration process. 
Conversely, extreme negative shifters used fewer categories across 
tasks and very few categories on the Sort II and seemed to be people 
who relied on "global thinking" (Cornelius, 1968).
In contrast to previous literature, Cornelius concluded that 
different patterns in categorization behavior emerged in his 
sample as self involvement increased. While some of his subjects 
did in fact use fewer categories as the literature would have pre­
dicted, others used more and this pattern was consistent across
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tasks. In essence, Cornelius (1968) was suggesting that the dif­
ferential performance reflected differing cognitive styles associ­
ated with categorization. This was considered to be closely akin 
to an underlying difference between groups, and between sexes, 
in the degree of differentiation (in the Witkin (195M-) sense) of 
the subjects.
The Differentiation Hypothesis and Field Dependence-independence
Out of numerous investigations of the perceptual processes 
Witkin and associates (Witkin, et. , 195M-; 1962) discovered 
certain consistent trends in subject*s perception over a broad 
spectrum of perceptual tasks. These trends constitute a sub­
ject’s "style" of perceiving. A primary point of comparison of 
perceptual styles revolves around the capacity of the perceiver 
to keep objects separated from their surround in the perceptual 
field. In the mode of perception Witkin called field-dependent, 
perception is strongly dominated by the field and parts of the 
field are experiences as fused. In the field-independent mode 
of perception, parts of the field are experienced as discrete and 
separate from the surround.
Out of the perceptual research of Witkin’s group emerged 
several tests to measure field dependence, e.g., body adjustment 
test, rod and frame test and embedded figure test. It was dis­
covered that subjects who were more or less field-dependent on 
one of these tests tended to perceive in this fashion on the 
others also. Artifacts of a subjects’ style of perception were
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pervasive on intellectual tasks as well. Field-independent per- 
ceivers showed to be more analytical while field-dependent people 
were more diffuse thinkers. Field-dependent perceivers came to 
be described as "global," while field-independent perceivers were 
called "articulated." It was later concluded that rather than 
people tending to be either field-dependent or independent, the 
distribution of styles of perception was actually rather normally 
distinct; i.e., few of either extreme field dependent or field- 
independent perceivers and most people lying toward the middle 
ranges of the continuum (Witkin, 1965).
To account for differences in cognitive style the principle 
of differentiation-integration was applied to psychological dev­
elopment.
. . . analysis of the growth experience of the self 
and the world led us to postulate that progress 
toward differentiation would be expressed in 
increasing articulation (that is, analysis and 
structuring) of experience. Included in this is 
a more articulated way of experiencing the 
world; also included are a more clearly defined 
body concept, and a growing sense of separate 
identity, which together reflect particularly 
the development of self-differentiation (Witkin, 
et. al., 1962).
In essence, Witkin suggested that subparts of the cognitive 
structure became "differentiated" from the primitive global base. 
Each structure is then "integrated" back into the initial super­
structure. Thus integration of the differentiated parts results 
in increased sophistication and complexity of the total system.
In keeping with the notion of relatively more differentiated 
psychological systems, reflected in terms of field-independence.
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research has demonstrated in field-independent perceivers a more 
sophisticated ego defense structure, (Witkin, 1965; Minard and 
Mooney, 1969). The study of the developmental trend of the 
body concept has recently been investigated and has tended to 
validate the differentiation hypothesis, (Faterson and Witkin, 
1970). Additional support has come from the studies relating 
field-independent perception to ego defenses of isolation (Bertini, 
i960) and intellectualization (Schimek, 1968); field dependent 
perception has been related to the less differentiated defenses 
of denial and repression (Ihilevich, 1968; Weddig, 1968).
As an expression of the extremities of field dependent- 
independent perception Taylor (1965) showed that psychotics who 
hallucinate tend to be field-dependent while psychotics with 
elaborate delusional systems tend to be field-independent. He 
predicted such an outcome on the basis that hallucinatory states 
imply ego boundary dissolution while delusional statt s imply 
attempts to maintain separate identity and ego integrity (Taylor, 
1955). This conclusion was later confirmed and supported as 
evidence of the validity of the differentiation hypothesis by 
Powell (1965) .
Numerous studies have shown relationships between perceptual 
styles expressed in the field dependent-independent cognitive 
style and a broad array of other psychological manifestations. 
Witkin (1962) described the general interpersonal style of people 
characterized as either field-dependent and field-independent and 
identified traits associated with these styles. Not all attenpts
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to predict the relatively normal subject’s performance on person­
ality inventories merely from his position on a cognitive style 
dimension have been of much success however (Adevai, Silverman, 
and McGough, 1968) .
As representative of one line of research, Adevai (et. al., 
1968) compared 22 field-dependent and 22 field-independent college 
freshmen on the MMPI, Baron Ego-Strength Scale, and the Taylor 
Anxiety Scale. Their results showed these subjects to be more 
similar than dissimilar in terms of the measures used. They con­
cluded that to find differences between subjects identified on a 
perceptual measure on a non-perceptually determined instrument will 
yield spurious findings. They question in fact that differences 
measurable by pencil and paper personality inventories will emerge 
between "normal” subjects.
This review of the literature attempted to view categorization 
tasks within its historical context and to examine its emerging 
involvement in the study of cognition, especially to that of the 
cognitive control referred to as conceptual differentiation. 
Cornelius’ (1968) opposed earlier conclusions which suggested that 
categorization behavior was a unitary dimension predictable from 
the stimulus situation. Rather, he described it as a manifestation 
of the cognitive reorganization of subjects due to the increase in 
ego-involvement stimulated by a dual sorting task varied in degree 
of ego-involvement by way of instructions. The operational def­
inition of increased categories, i.e., differentiations between 
stimuli, as a function of increased ego-involvement led Cornelius
31
to suspect that an underlying and parallel dimension along which 
shift groups differed has to do with their level of psychological 
differentiation. This dimension in terms of the measure of field 
dependence-independence was also discussed.
Statement of Problem 
The findings of Cornelius (1968) suggest there to be a direct 
relationship between the level of psychological differentiation 
of subjects and the number of categories used on the second sort 
of a dual sorting task in which the second sort is more self­
involving than the former. The operations involved in sorting 
self-related stimuli into categories, i.e., making differentiations, 
and the tendency of positive shifters to use more categories 
across tasks lead Cornelius to suspect them to be prone to such 
ego defenses as intellectualization and con^artmentalization. 
Negative shifters, on the other hand, appeared to be representative 
of people Witkin (1962) called "global thinkers." The implication 
is that positive shifters would be field-independent and that 
negative shifters would be field-dependent perceivers.
This part of the present research, then is an attempt to deter­
mine the reJa tionship between the shift dimension and the dimension 
of field dependence-independence. The Hidden-Figures-Test will be 
used to assess field dependence. The suspected relationship be­
tween these two measures suggested the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis I. Subjects who are characterized as positive 
shifters will tend to be field-i" dependent and subjects who are
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characterized as negative shifters will tend to be field-dependent 
to an extent greater than that expected by chance.
One of the variables that differentiated between positive 
and negative shifters in Cornelius study involved a self-ideal 
discrepancy, and reason suggested them to differ in ego-defense 
pattern. A result of this line of thought suggested that they 
would also differ in response to a measure tapping personality 
organization. Cornelius also found a sex difference on the shift 
dimension. It was suspected that differences in response to a 
measure of personality organization would be found between shift 
groups and in terms of sex differences within the groups. The 
California Psychological Inventory will be used to assess per­
sonality organization. The following research hypotheses were 
adopted :
Hypothesis II. There will be differences among the means 
of the groups in scores on the California Psychological Inven­
tory.
Hypothesis III. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Dominance (Do) Scale.
Hypothesis IV. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Capacity for Status (Cs) Scale.
Hypothesis V. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Sociability (So) Scale.
Hypothesis VI. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Social Presence (Sp) Scale.
Hypothesis VII. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Self-acceptance (Sa) Scale.
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Hypothesis VIII. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Sense of Well-Being (WHO) Scale.
Hypothesis IX. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Responsibility (Re) Scale.
Hypothesis X. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Socialization (So) Scale.
Hypothesis XI. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Self-Control (Sc) Scale.
Hypothesis XII. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Tolerance (To) Scale.
Hypothesis XIII. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Good Impression (Gi) Scale.
Hypothesis XIV. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Communality (Cm) Scale.
Hypothesis XV. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Achievement via Conformance (Ac) Scale.
Hypothesis XVI. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Achievement via Independence (Ai) Scale.
Hypothesis XVII. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Intellectual Efficiency (le) Scale.
Hypothesis XVIII. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Psychological-Mindedness (Py) Scale.
Hypothesis XIX. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Flexibility (Fx) Scale.
Hypothesis XX. There will be mean score differences among 
the groups on the Femininity (Fe) Scale.
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Hypothesis XXI. There will be mean score differences among 
the scales of the California Psychological Inventory.
Hypothesis XXII. There will be mean score differences among 
the scales of the Male Positive-shift Group.
Hypothesis XXIII. There will be mean score differences among 
the scales of the Female Positive-shift Group.
Hypothesis XXIV. There will be mean score differences among 
the scales of the Male Negative-shift Group.
Hypothesis XXV. There will be mean score differences among 
the scales of the Female Negative-shift Group.
Hypothesis XXVI. There will be interactions among the means 
of the groups and scales of the California Psychological Inven­
tory.
The .05 level of significance will be the minimum required 
to reject the null form of the research hypothesis.
METHOD
Selection of Subjects
Subjects will be male and female volunteers currently enrolled 
at the University of Oklahoma. Little is known regarding the pop­
ulation of subjects characterized by the shift dimension. However, 
if the relationship between field-dependence and cognitive shift 
corresponds to expectations, it is reasonable to assume their dis­
tributions are quite similar. Subjects 18 to 21 years of age
should not differ in developmental influence and can be considered
equivalent subjects differing only in their levels of field-
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dependence (Faterson and Witkin, 1970; Witkin, Goodenou^ and 
Karp, 1967) .
Test Instruments and Procedure
Subjects will complete two sorting tasks requiring them to 
"place into categories those statements that seem to you to go to­
gether.” These statements will be 50 of the Butler and H a i ^  (1950) 
self-statements printed on standard sized IBM cards. Two iden­
tical sets of the 50 statements will be sorted; however, the ini­
tial sort will require subjects to sort them as statements. The 
second sort will require subjects to sort them ”as they apply to 
you.” This is essentially a replication of Cornelius (1968) pro­
cedure, and it is assumed that Sort II will constitute a level 
of self-involvement increased over Sort I.
The proportion of positive shifters in any population is not 
known and inferring from Cornelius data it m i ^ t  be expected to be 
small. It is therefore likely that the sorting task will need to 
be administered to a large pool of subjects to insure an adequate 
sample size. Also to insure the extremes of the shift population 
it has been suggested by Cornelius (1971) that only subjects who in­
crease in number of categories on the second sort and who use 9 or 
more categories be considered positive shifters. Those who decrease 
in number of categories and who use four or fewer categories will be 
considered negative shifters. Equivalent sized cells of male and 
female, positive and negative shifters will be selected randomly 
from among the group of subjects whose performance meets the criterion 
suggested by Cornelius for inclusion into the shift group extremes.
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The sorting task can be administered in groups and will re­
quire from 1+5 to 90 minutes to complete. Subjects whose cate­
gorization performance meets the criterion for inclusion into 
the extreme shift groups will be administered two additional 
measures during a later testing session: The Hidden-Figures-
Test and the California Psychological Inventory.
The Hidden-Figures-Test (HFT) is a test designed to assess 
field-dependence and has shown to have significant positive 
correlations with both the Embedded Figures Test (Goodman, 1962; 
Phillips, 1962) and the Rod and Frame Test (Goodman, 1962; Rudin 
and Stagner, 1958). The HFT consists of 32 complex patterns of 
straight lines in which one of 5 geometric figures is embedded. 
Subjects are instructed to find which one of the 5 figures is 
included in the pattern and to indicate it in a multiple-choice 
response. The test is suitable for group administration and is 
suggested to require 20 minutes to complete.
In addition to the HFT measure of field-dependence shift 
groups will be compared on the basis of their responses to the 
18 scales of the California Psychological Inventory (CPI). The 
CPI consists of 980 items and yields 18 measures of social inter­
action. Each single scale is intended to cover one important 
facet of interpersonal behavior, and the total set of 18 is intended 
to provide a comprehensive survey of a subject’s social inter­
action. Kelly (1965) reports however, that the "comprehensiveness" 
of the 18 scales is questionable and that recent factor analytic 
studies have shown that the CPI best measures differences when
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the 18 scales are grouped into four broad areas. He felt however, 
that the CPI was one of, if not the best, instrument of its kind 
to use with normal subjects. Test-retest coefficients are re­
ported to be as h i ^  as any found in personality measurement 
(Gou^, 1969).
Experimental Design 
Four groups— male, female, negative and positive shifters—  
will be compared as to response to the 18 independent measures 
of the CPI. This data will be analyzed in a split-plot factorial 
design with non-repeated measures on 2 factors and repeated 
measures on one factor (Kirk, 1968). To test the extent of 
association between the two attributes of shift and field-depend­
ence, Spearman Rank Order Correlation Coefficients (r^) for male, 
female, and total groups will be completed (Siegel, 1956).
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Appendix II 
Table 1 
Group Means and Variances
Group Dominance Cap for Status Sociability See Presence Self-Accept Sense of W.B.
n=6 mean var. mean var. mean var. mean var. mean var. mean var.
MPS 48.17 275.76 47.83 138.16 45.67 52.26 52.67 26.66 55.17 173.76 40.33 240.66
FPS 52.50 253.10 46.00 40.80 48.33 35.86 58.83 100.56 61.67 91.86 33.67 136.26
MNS 48.83 143.36 46.50 126.30 50.50 243.30 59.67 58.66 61.83 104.56 44.67 151.06
FNS 56.50 157.10 51.00 126.00 50.67 214.66 57.00 196.80 58.50 121.50 47.33 64.66





















































































































Raw Data of Shift Scores
MALES 
Sort I - Sort II
FEMALES 
Sort I - Sort II
10-14 ** 10-15
11-13 ** 6-15 * (DNS)
10-13 ** 7-13 **
8-11 ** 6-12 **
6-11 ** 10-11 **
8-9 ** 10-11 **
7-8 8-11 **PS
PS 6-7 5-9
3-7 ZERO SHIFT 4-8
5-6 6-7
5-6 Male Female 5-6
4-6 Sort Sort 4-6






10-8 5-S 4-4 5-6
9-7 3-3 4-4 6-5















*Did not complete second task - CPI and HPT




Raw Data of Shift and HFT Scores
SUBJECT SORT I SORT II HFT*
1 10 ILf 12.25
2 11 13 10.75
MALES 3 10 13 13.00
L̂ 8 11 24.00
5 6 11 11.75
6 8 9 7.75
7 10 15 13.75
8 7 13 5.75
FEMALES 9 6 12 6.50
10 10 11 1.50
11 10 11 9.75
12 8 11 28.00
13 5 L4 8.75
1L| L4 3 25.00
MALES 15 14 3 18.00
16 L̂ 3 13.75
17 L4 3 13.75
18 L4 2 14.00
19 5 L̂ 17.75
20 5 L4 8.75
FEMALES 21 5 L| 15.00
22 5 L̂ 12.75
23 L4 3 0.00
214 3 2 11.25




Newman Keuls Test of CPI Means
Sc Gi Re Wb To Ac So le Cs Cm
Sc .46 3.08 3.67 5.75 5.83 7. 87 8.29 10.00 10.37
Gi 2.62 3.21 5.29 5.37 7. 41 7.84 9.54 9.91
Re .59 2.67 2.75 4. 89 5.21 6.92 7.29
Wb 2.08 2.16 4. 20 4.62 6.33 6.70
To .08 2.12 2.54 44.25 4.62
Ac 2. 04 2.46 4.17 4.54




Sy Py Do Fe Ai Sp Sa Fx
Sc 10.96 11.62 13.67* 15.21* 15.92* 19.21* 21.46* 21.62*
Gi 10.50 11.16 13.21* 14.75* 15.46* 18.75* 21.00* 21.16*
Re 7.88 8.54 10.59 12.13 12.84 16.31* 18.38* 18.54*
Wb 7.29 7.95 10.00 11.54 12.75 15.54* 17.79* 17.95*
To 5.21 5.87 7.92 9.46 10.17 13.46* 15.71* 15.87*
Ac 5.13 5.49 7.84 9.38 10.09 13.38* 15.63* 15.79*
So 3.09 3.75 5.80 7.34 8.05 11.34 13.59* 13.75*
le 2.67 3.33 5.38 6.92 7.63 10.92 13.17* 13.33*
Cs .96 1.62 3.67 5.21 5.92 9.21 11.46* 11.62*
Cm .59 1.25 3.30 4.84 5.55 8.84 11.09 11.25
Sy . 66 .71 4.25 4.96 8.25 10.50 10.66
Py 2.05 3.59 4.30 7.59 9.84 10.00
Do 1.54 2.25 5.54 7.79 7.95
Fe .71 4.00 6.25 6.41




*Xr < .01 fl71 Critical Values
W1 = 7.896 W5 = 10.901 W9 = 12.076 W13 = 12.807 W17 = 13.231
W2 = 9.129 W6 = 11.257 WIG = 12.287 WH+ = 12.827 W18 = 13.366
W3 = 9.899 W7 = 11.575 Wll = 12.1+80 W15 = 12.961




Analysis of Variance Summary
Source of Variation SS df MS F P*
1. Between Subj; 19436.85 23 845.08
2. A (Shift) 1587.00 1 1587.00 1.33 > .05
3. C (Sex) 85.33 1 85.33 [fj .098 > .05
4. AC 498.37 1 498.37 .57 > .05
5. Subj: W/Groups 17266.07 20 863.30
6. Within Subj. 54608.90 408 133.84
7. B (Personality) 18023.25 17 1060.19 '7'
lU J
10.98* < .01*
8. AB 1311.25 17 77.13 8 “n .79 > .05
9. BC 1236.09 17 72.71 r9 “1W .75 > .05
10. ABC 1223.38 17 60.19 1011 .62 > .05
11. B X Subj: 
W/Groups
32814.93 340 96.51
12. Total 74045.67 431
Critical Values
F.05 (1,20) = 4.35 
F.Ol (1,20) = 8.10 
F.05 (17,340) = 1.63 
F.Ol (17,340) =2.01
*P = Two Tailed Test
50
Appendix III 
Instructions for Dual Sorting Task
This task involves the three stacks of IBM cards before you. 
There are two stacks of white cards and one stack of colored 
cards. The two stacks of white cards are labelled 1 and 11. The 
stacks are identical, but the instructions are different for the 
way each is to be handled, so use only stack 1 for the time being. 
(Instructions as to how to use stack 11 are on the following 
page.)
Now take stack 1. You will notice that on each card is printed 
a statement. The instructions are singly to put together into 
groups the statements that seem to belong together. Treat the 
statements £S statements, ignoring the fact that they are first 
person or self-referring statements. You may have as many or 
few statements in a group as you like, so long as the statements 
in each group belong together for a particular reason. If, after 
you have thought about all the statements, a few do not seem to 
belong with any of the others, you may put these statements into 
groups by themselves. Please sort all the statements.
Obviously, there can be no right or wrong way to sort these 
statements. What is of interest is the way you sort them.
After you have sorted the statements to your satisfaction 
take one of the colored cards and place it on top of each group 
of white cards. Then, stack the groups in what ever order seems 
most appropriate. Be sure to place the card marked Stack 1 on 
top of the stack and replace a rubber band around the stack.
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Appendix III (cont’d)
Now, turn to the next page.
Now, take the second stack of white cards, labelled Stack
11. The procedure is essentially the same as that for Stack 1. 
This time, however, you are to put the statements together which 
belong together ^  they apply to you.
After you have sorted the statements into groups place one 
of the colored cards on top of each group of statements. Then, 
stack them in whatever order seems appropriate for you. Be sure 
to place the label card. Stack 11, back on top and secure the 
stack with the rubber band.
Now, in order for you to recejye credit for having partici­
pated in the experiment, please sign the additional blank white 
card which was among the colored stack of cards, so that I may 
properly credit your having been here today.
I thank you for your participation in this first part of the 
experiment. You will be notified by phone within the following 
few days if you are to complete the second phase of the experi­




1. I feel uncomfortable while talking with someone.
2. I often kick myself for the things I do.
3. I often feel humiliated.
*+. I doubt my sexual powers.
5. I have a warm emotional relationship with others.
6. I am responsible for my troubles.
7. I can accept most social values and standards.
8. I have a hard time controlling my sexual desires.
9. It is difficult to control my aggression.
10. I am often down in the dumps.
11. I am really self-centered.
12. I can usually live comfortably with the people around me.
13. My hardest battles are with myself.
1I+. I tend to be on my guard with people who are somewhat more
friendly than I had expected.
15. I am optimistic.
16. I am just sort of stubborn.
17. I feel helpless.
18. I can usually make up my mind and stick to it.
19. My decisions are not my own.
20. I often feel guilty.
21. I am a hostile person.
22. I am contented.
23. I am disorganized.
21-1-. I am poised.
25. I am impulsive.
26. I have the feeling that I am just not facing things.
27. I am tolerant.
28. I feel inferior.
29. I am no one. Nothing seems to really be me.
30. I am afraid of what other people think of me.
31. I am ambitious.
32. I despise myself.
33. I just don’t respect myself.
39, I am a dominant person.
35. I am assertive.
36. I am confused.
37. I am satisfied with myself.
38. I am a failure.
39. I am likable.
MO, I am relaxed, and nothing really bothers me.
Ml. I am a hard worker.
M2. I feel emotionally mature.
M3. I really am disturbed.
MM. I feel insecure within myself.
M5. I am intelligent.
46. I feel hoepless.
47. I am inhibited.
48. I am unreliable.
49. I feel adequate.
50. I am worthless.
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Appendix IV (cont'd)
